Show HN: AVP – an agent can't leak a secret it never had

Just-in-time API keys for AI agents - and any other process you route through it: the caller only ever sees a placeholder. - inflightsec/agent-vault-proxy
3 points by radku 132 days ago github.com 1 comments
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A process can't leak a secret it never had.

Shai-hulud, prompt-injection - you name it. They cannot steal what your agent (or an process) don't have.

I run coding agents (Claude Code, Codex) on my own machines most of the day. Every one of them wants real API keys in env and I was scratching my head for the last few months how to contain it.

The usual answer to this is a firewall. I don't buy it. A firewall tries to contain a secret the process is still holding, and the rules are painful to maintain.

AVP gives the agent a placeholder and injects the real value at the last moment, on the wire: ``` # the agent's env holds only a placeholder STRIPE_API_KEY=avp-placeholder # agent sends: Authorization: Bearer avp-placeholder # AVP forwards upstream: Authorization: Bearer sk_live_...real... ```

Keep your passwords in your vault where they belong. AVP initially relies on Bitwarden as a secret manager. It's MIT licensed.

Appreciate any feedback.

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